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Abstract 
Data from several investor surveys suggest that macroeconomic instability, investment 
restrictions, corruption and political instability have a negative impact on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to Africa. However, the relationship between FDI and these country 
characteristics has not been studied. This paper uses panel data for 22 countries over the 
period 1984-2000 to examine the impact of natural resources, market size, government 
policies, political instability and the quality of the host country’s institutions on FDI. It 
also analyses the importance of natural resources and market size vis-à-vis government 
policy and the host country’s institutions in directing FDI flows. The main result is that 
natural resources and large markets promote FDI. However, lower inflation, good 
infrastructure, an educated population, openness to FDI, less corruption, political 
stability and a reliable legal system have a similar effect. A benchmark specification 
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shows that a decline in the corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South Africa 
has the same positive effect on FDI as increasing the share of fuels and minerals in total 
exports by about 35 per cent. These results suggest that countries that are small or lack 
natural resources can attract FDI by improving their institutions and policy 
environment.  
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1 
We [the United Nations General Assembly] resolve to halve, by the 
year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is 
less than one dollar a day. We also resolve to take special measures 
to address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable 
development in Africa, including debt cancellation, improved 
market access, enhanced Official Development Assistance and 
increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment, as well as transfers of 
technology.  
United Nations Millennium Declaration, 8 September 2000 
1 Introduction 
When it comes to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the 
common perception is that FDI is largely driven by natural resources and market size. 
This perception seems to be consistent with the data: the three largest recipients of FDI 
are Angola, Nigeria and South Africa,1 from 2000 to 2002, these countries absorbed 
about 65 per cent of FDI flows to the region (World Bank 2004b).2 Thus, this 
perception if true is troubling for three reasons. First, it suggests that FDI in the region 
is largely determined by an uncontrollable factor, and that natural resource-poor 
countries or small countries will attract very little or no FDI, regardless of the policies 
the country pursues. Second, the countries in SSA are small in terms of income—23 out 
of the 47 countries in the region have a GDP of less than US$3 billion. Indeed, in 2002, 
the total GDP of SSA excluding South Africa was US$214 billion, which was equal to 
about a quarter of the GDP of Brazil and about one-half of the GDP of Mexico (World 
Bank 2004b). Third, FDI in resource-rich countries are concentrated in natural resources 
and investments in such industries tend not to generate the positive spillovers (e.g., 
technological transfers, employment creation) that are often associated with FDI 
(Asiedu 2004).3  
This paper answers three questions. What are the determinants of FDI to Africa? Can 
small countries or countries that lack natural resources attract FDI? How important are 
natural resources and market size vis-à-vis government policy and host country’s 
institutions in directing FDI flows to the region?  
The analysis is important for several reasons. First, as indicated by the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, an increase in FDI will help the continent achieve its 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing poverty rates by half in 2015.4 The 
                                                 
1  South Africa has a large local market and contributes about 46 per cent of SSA’s GDP. The share of 
GDP for Nigeria and Angola are 8 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. Angola and Nigeria are oil 
producing countries—oil accounts for over 90 per cent of total exports. 
2  The breakdown of FDI flows is as follows: 36 per cent to South Africa, 16 per cent to Nigeria, 13 per 
cent to Angola and 19 per cent to the remaining 45 countries in the region.  
3  Asiedu (2004) finds that natural resource availability does not have a significant impact on 
multinational employment in SSA.  
4  One of the main themes of the MDG adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2000, is to 
reduce the number of people living on less than a dollar a day by 50 per cent. The MDG is particularly 
important to Sub-Saharan Africa because the poverty rate for the region is very high. About 48 per 
cent of the populations live on less than one dollar a day. This compares with 4 per cent for Eastern  
2 
importance of FDI in eradicating poverty is also echoed in the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) declaration, which stipulates that in order for the 
continent to achieve the MDG, the region needs to fill an annual resource gap of US$64 
billion, about 12 per cent of GDP.5 Since income levels and domestic savings in the 
region are low, a bulk of the finance will have to come from abroad. However, official 
assistance to the region has been declining.6 In addition, most of the countries in the 
region do not have access to international capital markets. As a consequence, the 
resources needed for poverty alleviation have to come from FDI. From 1995-2001, 
annual FDI flows to SSA averaged about US$7 billion. Average annual flows fall to 
US$2.9 billion when Angola, Nigeria and South Africa are excluded. Thus, filling the 
annual resource gap of US$64 billion needed for poverty alleviation would require a 
substantial increase in FDI.  
Given the importance of FDI to the region, it is surprising that there is a dearth of 
research on the factors that affect FDI to Africa. A search of the Econlit database using 
‘foreign direct investment’ and ‘Africa’ as keywords yielded only five journal articles 
on the determinants of FDI to Africa.7 The papers have two limitations. First, none of 
them include minerals and oil as a determinant of FDI. Second, none of the papers 
examine the effect of corruption, political risk and investment policies on FDI. This is 
surprising because surveys of multinational corporations operating in Africa (section 2 
provides a brief description of four surveys) reveal that these factors are important 
determinants of FDI to the region.  
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing the impact of natural resources, 
market size, physical infrastructure, human capital, the host country’s investment 
policies, the reliability of the host country’s legal system, corruption and political 
instability on FDI flows. The analysis utilizes panel data for 22 countries in SSA over 
the period 1984-2000. There are three reasons for limiting the sample to African 
countries. First, as pointed out earlier, the literature on FDI to Africa is scant. Second, 
results from several investor surveys indicate that the factors that attract FDI to Africa 
are different from the factors that drive FDI in other regions (e.g., Batra, Kaufman and 
Stone 2003; Brunetti, Kisunko and Wider 1997). This observation is also consistent 
with the empirical results of Asiedu (2002). The third reason for limiting the sample to 
African countries is the widespread perception that the region is structurally different 
from the rest of the world. Indeed, many African policymakers believe the lessons from 
East Asia or Latin America do not apply to them because their situation is different. But 
African leaders can learn from each other. Hence, an empirical analysis that focuses on 
                                                                                                                                               
and Central Europe, 15 per cent for East Asia, 12 per cent for Latin America, 2 per cent for the Middle 
East and North Africa, 40 per cent for South Asia, and 24 per cent for all developing countries. 
Furthermore, for several countries in the region, more than half of the populations live in abject 
poverty. For example the poverty rate for Burkina Faso is 62 per cent, 66 per cent for Central African 
Republic, 73 per cent for Mali, 70 per cent for Nigeria and 64 per cent for Zambia. See Nunnenkamp 
(2004) for a discussion of the role of FDI in achieving the MDG. 
5  NEPAD is a development plan put together by African leaders to eradicate poverty and promote 
growth in the region. For more on this issue see Funke and Nsouli (2003) and Owusu (2003). 
6  For example, net official development assistance to SSA declined from US$187 billion in 1990 to 
US$10 billion in 2001, a decrease of about 41 per cent (World Bank 2003a).  
7  The papers are Lemi and Asefa (2003); Bende-Nabende (2002); Asiedu (2002); Morisset (2000) and 
Schoeman, Robinson and de Wet (2000).  
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performance within the continent will have greater credibility among African 
policymakers. 
The main result is that countries that are endowed with natural resources or have large 
markets will attract more FDI. However, good infrastructure, an educated labour force, 
macroeconomic stability, openness to FDI, an efficient legal system, less corruption and 
political stability also promote FDI. A benchmark specification shows that a decline in 
corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South Africa has the same positive effect 
on FDI as increasing the share of fuels and minerals in total exports (NATEXP) by about 
34.84 per cent. Also, an improvement in the host country’s FDI policy from that of 
Nigeria to that of South Africa has the same positive effect on FDI as increasing 
NATEXP 23.01 per cent. A similar change in corruption and FDI policy will have the 
same effect as increasing GDP by 0.37 per cent and 0.25 per cent, respectively. These 
results suggest that countries that have small markets or countries that lack natural 
resources can attract FDI by streamlining their investment framework and improving 
their institutions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a summary of 
the results from four surveys on the factors that constrain FDI to SSA. Section 3 
describes the data and the explanatory variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results 
and section 5 concludes.  
2  Constraints on FDI to Africa: results from four surveys 
This section describes the factors that constrain FDI to Africa. The discussion focuses 
on four surveys:  
i)  World Business Environment (WBE) Survey  
  The survey was conducted by the World Bank in 1999/2000. It covered about 
10,000 firms in 80 countries. The sample for SSA included 413 foreign firms in 16 
countries.8 Respondents were asked to judge on a four point scale the extent to 
which a particular factor constrained their business operations in a country (1= no 
constraint to 4= severe constraint).   
ii)  World Development Report (WDR) Survey 
  The survey was conducted by the World Bank in 1996/7. It covered 3,600 firms in 
69 countries. The sample for SSA included 540 foreign firms in 22 countries.9 
Respondents were asked to judge on a six point scale the extent to which a 
particular factor constrained their business operations in a country (1= no 
constraint to 6= severe constraint). 
 
                                                 
8  See Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003) for a detailed description of the survey.  
9  For a detailed description of the survey see Brunetti, Kisunko and Wider (1997).  
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iii)  World Investment Report (WIR) Survey 
  The survey was conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in 1999/2000. It covered 63 large transnational 
corporations (TNCs) from the database of the top 100 TNCs of UNCTAD.10 
Respondents were asked to cite the factors that deter FDI to SSA. 
iv)  The Center for Research into Economics and Finance in Southern Africa 
(CREFSA) Survey  
  The survey covered 81 TNCs in the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC).11 Respondents were asked to identify the factors that constrain FDI in the 
SADC.  
Table 1 summarizes the results from the WBE and WDR survey and it reports the 
average score for each constraining factor. Table 2 presents the summary for the WIR 
and CREFSA surveys and it shows the percentage of firms that identified a particular 
factor as a constraint to FDI. Two points stand out from the two tables. First, corruption 
ranks very high on the list of obstacles in all four surveys. Second, FDI regulations, 
financing constraints, weak infrastructure, macroeconomic instability (which includes 
inflation and exchange rate risk) and political instability are strong deterrents of FDI to 
Africa. Section 4 empirically analyses how these factors affect FDI flows to Africa.  
3  Description of the data and the variables 
The analysis covers 22 countries in SSA over the period 1984-2000. As is standard in 
the literature, the dependent variable is the ratio of net FDI flows to GDP. Unless 
otherwise stated, all the data were obtained from World Development Indicators on 
CD-Rom, published by the World Bank in 2003. The number of countries and the 
variables included in the regressions were determined by data availability. The summary 
statistics are in Table 3. 
3.1  Description of explanatory variables 
Policy variables  
These are variables that can be directly altered by policymakers. I include four policy 
variables in my regressions to measure macroeconomic stability, infrastructure 
development, human capital and openness to FDI. As is standard in the literature I use 
the inflation rate as a measure of macroeconomic instability (INFLATION), the 
percentage of adults who are literate to measure human capital (LITERACY), and the 
                                                 
10 See UNCTAD (2000) for a detailed description of the survey. 
11 The countries included in the SADC are Angola, Botswana, Congo Dem Rep, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. See Jenkins and Thomas (2002) for a detailed description of the survey.  
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number of telephone main lines per 1000 population to measure infrastructure 
development, (INFRAC).12  
In the FDI literature, the most widely used measure of openness is the share of trade in 
GDP. Thus, the positive relationship between trade volumes and FDI implies that 
countries that wish to attract more FDI should increase trade. However, as pointed out 
by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), this type of policy recommendation is not 
constructive. The reason is that policymakers do not directly control the volume of 
trade. Since one of the objectives of this paper is to prescribe policies that will enhance 
FDI flows to Africa, I consider a measure of openness that can be directly influenced by 
policymakers. I use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that 
measures the host country’s attitude towards inward investment.13 The index ranges 
from 0 to 12 (a higher score implies more openness) and is determined by four 
components: risk to operations, taxation, repatriation of profits and labour costs.  
The hypothesis is that the estimated coefficients of LITERACY,  INFRAC and the FDI 
policy index should be positive and the estimated coefficient of INFLATION should be 
negative. 
Institutional variables 
As pointed out earlier, several investor surveys suggest that one of most important 
deterrents of FDI to Africa is corruption. Several papers have also shown that inefficient 
institutions as measured by corruption and weak enforcement of contracts deter foreign 
investment (Asiedu and Villamil 2000; Wei 2000; Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova 
1998; Campos, Lien and Pradhan 1999). For my analysis, I employ two measures of 
institutional quality: corruption and the extent to which the rule of law is enforced. The 
corruption variable measures the degree of corruption within the political system. It 
covers actual or potential corruption in the form of nepotism, excessive patronage and 
bribery. The ratings range from 0 to 6, a high rating indicates that corruption is more 
prevalent. The rule of law variable measures the impartiality of the legal system and the 
extent to which the rule of law is enforced. The ratings range from 0 to 6, a high rating 
implies a more impartial court system. Both variables are from ICRG. 
Political risk variables 
The hypothesis is that political instability deters FDI. I employ three measures of 
political instability: (i) Coups; the number of forced changes in the top government; 
(ii) Assassinations; include any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a 
high government official; (iii) Revolutions; include any illegal or forced change in the 
ruling government. The data were obtained from the Cross-National Time Series Data 
Archive.14  
                                                 
12 See Asiedu (2002) for a discussion on the caveats of using telephone per capita as a measure of 
infrastructure development. 
13 The ICRG is published by Political Risk Services, available at: www.prsgroup.com/. 
14 More information is available: www.databanks.sitehosting.net/www/main.htm.  
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Other variables 
I use the share of minerals and oil in total exports (NATEXP) as a measure of natural 
resource availability and GDP to measure the size of the host country’s domestic 
market. The estimated coefficients of NATEXP and GDP are expected to be positive. 
4 Empirical  analysis 
The equation to be estimated is: 
(FDI/GDP)it = α + β1 NATEXPit + β2 GDPit + θ (Policy Variables)it + γ (Institutional Variables) it 
+ µ (Political Risk Variables) it + ε it  
I use a fixed-effects panel estimation for my analysis. The analysis employs an 
unbalanced panel data for 22 countries over the period 1984-2000.15 The infrastructure 
variable (INFRAC) and the human capital variable (LITERACY) are highly correlated. 
Thus, to avoid multicollinearity, I considered two specifications. Table 4 presents the 
results when LITERACY is included and Table 5 reports the results using INFRAC. I also 
consider three measures of political instability. For each specification, column (1) 
reports the results using the number of coups (COUPS) as a proxy for political risk, and 
columns (2) and (3) report the results for the number of riots and the number of 
assassinations, respectively. The results are qualitatively similar for all the 
specifications. To facilitate the discussion, I will focus on the estimation results reported 
for the benchmark case, where I include LITERACY and COUPS (column 1 of Table 4).  
All the variables have the predicted signs and are highly significant: large markets, 
natural resources, a good policy environment, good institutions and political stability 
promote FDI. The regression for the benchmark specification shows that a standard 
deviation of one increase in NATEXP results in a 0.65 per cent increase in FDI/GDP.16 
Also, a standard deviation of one increase in GDP results in a 2.61 per cent increase in 
FDI/GDP. 
In analysing the relative impact of natural resources and market size vis-à-vis the policy 
and institutional variables on FDI, I use Nigeria, the most corrupt country in my sample, 
and South Africa, the least corrupt country as benchmarks. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 
report the average values of the policy and institutional variables for the two countries 
over the period 1984-2000. Column 3 reports the estimated coefficients for the 
benchmark specification (see column 1 of Table 4). Column 4 shows the equivalent 
effect of a change in the policy and institutional variables for NATEXP and column 5 
reports a similar result for GDP. Table 7 reports similar information using the 
specification for the infrastructure variable and COUPS (column 1 of Table 5).  
Table 6 shows that a decrease in corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South 
Africa has the same positive effect as increasing NATEXP by 34.84 per cent.17 An 
                                                 
15 The unbalanced panel causes no problem if the missing data is not correlated with the idiosyncratic 
errors (Woodridge 2002). 
16 The standard deviation for NATEXP is 26.087 (Table 3). 
17 The change in corruption is equal to about 2.6 times the standard deviation (Table 3). The equivalent 
effect for a change in corruption is computed as follows: (4-1.56)*0.357/0.025. Note that the  
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improvement in the reliability of the legal system from the level of Nigeria to that of 
South Africa has the same positive effect as increasing NATEXP 32.14 per cent. A 
similar change in corruption and the rule of law will have the same effect as increasing 
GDP by 0.37 per cent and 0.34 per cent, respectively.18 For the policy variables, an 
improvement in the host country’s FDI policy from the level of Nigeria to that of South 
Africa will have the same positive effect on FDI as raising NATEXP by 23.01 per cent.  
An increase in the literacy rate from the level of Nigeria to that of South Africa will 
have the same positive effect on FDI as raising NATEXP by 91.8 per cent. A similar 
change in FDI policy and the literacy rate will have the same effect as increasing GDP 
by 0.25 per cent and 0.98 per cent, respectively. The results for the specification using 
INFRAC and COUP are qualitatively similar (Table 7). 
5  Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper has examined the determinants of FDI to Africa. The results indicate that 
large local markets, natural resource endowments, good infrastructure, low inflation, an 
efficient legal system and a good investment framework promote FDI. In contrast, 
corruption and political instability have the opposite effect. These findings are 
consistent with the reports of multinational companies that operate in the region.  
The results have several policy implications. First, it suggests that FDI in SSA is not 
solely driven by some exogenous factors, and that small countries and/or countries that 
lack natural resources can obtain FDI by improving their institutions and policy 
environment. Second, multilateral organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank 
can play an important role in facilitating FDI by promoting good institutions in 
countries in SSA.19  
The results also suggest that regional economic cooperation may enhance FDI to the 
region.20 There are three reasons for this. First, regionalism can promote political 
stability by restricting membership to democratically elected governments. Second, 
regionalism permits countries to coordinate their policies. For example, members of a 
regional bloc may require all participating countries to curb corruption, implement 
sound and stable macroeconomic policies, and adopt an ‘investor friendly’ regulatory 
framework (such as removing restrictions on profit repatriation). Errant countries may 
face costly sanctions or be barred from membership. Here, the threat of sanctions or 
losing access to the benefits that accrue from regionalism serves as an incentive for 
countries to implement ‘good’ policies. Another advantage of regionalism is that it 
expands the size of the market, and therefore makes the region more attractive for 
                                                                                                                                               
estimated coefficient of NATEXP and the corruption variable are 0.025 and 0.357, respectively 
(column 1 of Table 4). 
18 The estimated coefficient of GDP is 2.335 (column 1 of Table 4). 
19 There has been increased discussion about the role of multilateral organizations in promoting good 
institutions in developing countries (Asiedu and Villamil (2003); Frankel (2003); and Hakura and 
Nsouli (2003). 
20 An example of a regional bloc in SSA is the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Elbadawi and Mwega (1997) find evidence that after controlling for relevant country conditions, 
countries in the SADC region receive more FDI than other countries in Africa.  
8 
FDI.21 The market size advantage of regionalism is particularly important for Africa 
because countries in the region are small, both in terms of population and income. The 
caveat is that the small size of the countries may require that many countries be 
included in the coalition in order to achieve a market size that will be large enough to 
attract foreign investors. Policy coordination becomes difficult as the number of 
countries in the bloc increases. Indeed, the difficulty of coordinating and enforcing 
policies across many countries may be too costly in terms of time and resources—such 
that regionalism may be an infeasible option.  
Finally, it is important to note that increased FDI does not necessarily imply higher 
economic growth. Indeed, the empirical relationship between FDI and growth is 
unclear.22 Some studies have found a positive relationship between FDI and growth (De 
Gregorio 1992; Oliva and Rivera-Batiz 2002). Other studies conclude that FDI enhances 
growth only under certain condition—when the host country’s education exceeds a 
certain threshold (Borenzstein, Gregorio and Lee 1998); when domestic and foreign 
capital are complements (De Mello 1999); when the country has achieved a certain level 
of income (Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zegan 1994); when the country is open 
(Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford 1996) and when the host country has a well 
developed financial sector (Alfaro et al. 2004). In contrast, Carkovic and Levine (2002) 
conclude that the relationship between FDI and growth is not robust. These studies seem 
to suggest that for countries in SSA, reaping the benefits that accrue from FDI, if any, 
may be more difficult than attracting FDI. However, there is room for optimism. The 
policies that promote FDI to Africa also have a direct impact on long term economic 
growth. As a consequence, African countries cannot go wrong implementing such 
polices.  
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Constraints on FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Average rating for each constraining factor 
WBE (1=no constraint, 4=severe constraint)    WDR (1=no constraint, 6=severe constraint) 
Corruption  2.80    Taxes & regulations  4.50 
Weak infrastructure  2.75    Corruption  4.47 
Street crime  2.70    Weak infrastructure  4.28 
Inflation 2.67    Crime  4.25 
Financing 2.64    Inflation  4.11 
Organized crime  2.57    Lack of access to finance  3.95 
Political instability  2.43    Policy uncertainty  3.88 
Taxes and regulation  2.24    Cost uncertainty  3.75 




Constraints on FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa 
Percentage of firms identifying a factor as a constraint 
WIR Survey  CREFSA Survey 
Corruption 49  Policy  uncertainty  47 
Lack of access to global market  38  Macroeconomic instability  42 
Political and economic outlook  28  Crime  35 
Cost of doing business  28  Corruption  35 
Lack of access to finance  28  Policy uncertainty  34 
Weak infrastructure  27  Weak infrastructure  30 
Tax regulation  24  FDI regulations  24 
Unskilled labour  23  War  19 

















Dependent variable= 100*(FDI/GDP) 0.926  1.638  -8.52  9.587 
Market size = Log (GDP)  22.312 1.118  19.761  25.832 
Natural resources = Share of fuel and minerals in exports (%)  24.011 26.087  0.025 95.592 
      
Policy  variables      
Infrastructure = Log (phones per 1000 population)  2.009 0.849 0.916 4.856 
Human capital = Literacy rate (%)  56.449  18.935  13.512  87.88 
Macroeconomic instability = Inflation rate  15.6  24.155  -4.141  188.05 
FDI policy: Openness to FDI   5.886  1.639  2  10 
      
Institutional variables      
Corruption 3.105  0.94  1  6 
Effectiveness of the rule of law  2.996  0.909  1  5 
      
Political risk variables         
No. of assassinations  0.061  0.321  0  3 
No. of coups   0.015  0.123  0  1 
No. of riots  0.273  0.792  0  6 
Note:  Countries in the sample are Cameroon, Congo Rep., Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 





Fixed effects estimation:  
Results using the human capital variable (LITERACY) 
The dependent variable is 100*FDI/GDP 




















Policy  variables:     




















Institutional  variables:     












Political risk variables       
Lag (No. of coups )  -1.201***
(0.009) 
  
No. of riots    -0.231** 
(0.010) 
 
No. of assassinations      -0.626***
(0.008) 
R
2  0.492 0.491 0.494 
No. of countries  21  21  21 
No. of observations  137  137  137 






Fixed effects estimation results using the infrastructure variable (INFRAC) 
The dependent variable is 100*FDI/GDP 




















Policy  variables:     



















Institutional  variables:     












Political risk variables       
Lag (no. of coups )  -1.380*** 
(0.008) 
  
No. of riots    -0.215** 
(0.034) 
 
No. of assassinations      -0.688** 
(0.010) 
R
2  0.453 0.439 0.451 
No. of countries  22  22  22 
No. of observations  140  140  140 




 Table 6 
Estimated equivalent effect of a change in the policy and institutional variables vis-à-vis NATEXP and GDP 
for the regressions using LITERACY and COUPS (column 1 of Table 4) 
        Equivalent effect on 
  Nigeria South  Africa Estimated  coefficienta NATEXP  (%)b GDP  (%)c 
Institutional variables           
Corruption 4  1.56 0.357  34.84  0.37 
Rule of law  1.67  3.28 0.499  32.14  0.34 
         
Policy variables           
Openness to FDI   4.69 7.61  0.197  23.01  0.25 
Literacy rate (%)  48.04  83.90  0.064  91.80  0.98 
Inflation rate  15.44 7.61  0.013  4.07  0.04 
Notes:  
a   These are the absolute values of the estimated coefficients from Column 1 of Table 4. 
 b    The equivalent effect of a change in corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South 
Africa is given by (4-1.56)*.357/.025, where 0.025 is the estimated coefficient of NATEXP 
(column 1 of Table 4).  
 c  The equivalent effect of a change in corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South 
Africa is given by (4-1.56)*.357/2.335, where 2.335 is the estimated coefficient of GDP 
(column 1 of Table 4).  
 
Table 7 
Estimated equivalent effect of a change in the policy and institutional variables 
 vis-à-vis NATEXP and GDP for the regressions using INFRAC and COUPS (column 1 of Table 5) 
        Equivalent effect on 
  Nigeria  South Africa  Estimated Coefficienta NATEXP  (%)b GDP  (%)c 
Institutional  variables           
Corruption 4  1.56 0.474   33.04  0.63 
Rule of Law  1.67  3.28 0.528    24.30  0.46 
           
Policy  variables           
Openness to FDI   4.69 7.61  0.225   18.77  0.36 
Log (phones per 1000)  1.36 4.71  1.526   146.06  2.79 
Inflation rate  15.44  7.61 0.013    2.91  0.06 
Notes:  
a  These are the absolute values of the estimated coefficients from column 1 of Table 5. 
 b  The equivalent effect of a change in corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South 
Africa is given by (4-1.56)*.474/.035, where 0.035 is the estimated coefficient of NATEXP 
(column 1 of Table 5).  
 c   The equivalent effect of a change in corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South 
Africa is given by (4-1.56)*.474/1.83, where 1.83 is the estimated coefficient of GDP (column 
1 of Table 4). 
 